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SELECTIVE SERVICE-FAILING TO REGISTER
NOT A CONTINUING OFFENSE
Robert Toussie was born on June 23, 1941, and, according to the terms
of the Universal Military Training and Service Act,' he was obligated to
register for the draft when he turned 18, or within five days thereafter. In
Toussie's case, the last date allowed on which he could have registered
would have been June 28, 1959. He failed to register at that time or any-
time thereafter, however, and his default went unnoticed until he was twen-
ty-five (1966), when an anonymous tipster informed his draft board. He
was arrested in February, 1967, as a draft law violator, and was indicted
in May of 1967. Toussie was convicted, after a jury trial in the United
States District Court, 2 of failing to register for the draft: a violation of
50 U.S.C. § 462(a).3  His conviction was affirmed by the Court of Ap-
peals. 4
Before trial, Toussie moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing, inter
alia, that prosecution was barred by the running of the applicable five-year
statute of limitations. 5 His initial failure to register occurred in 1959 and
1. 50 U.S.C.A. § 453 (The Military Selective Service Act of 1967) provides:
"Except as otherwise provided in this title, it shall be the duty of every male citizen
...who, on the day or days fixed for the first or any subsequent registration, is
between the ages of eighteen and twenty-six, to present himself for and submit to
registration at such time or times and place or places, and in such manner, as shall
be determined . . . by rules and regulations prescribed hereunder." The applicable
Proclamation provides that "persons who were born on or after September 19, 1930,
shall be registered on the day they attain the eighteenth anniversary of the day of
their birth, or within five days thereafter." Presidential Proclamation No. 2799,
July 20, 1948, 64 Stat. 604, issued under Congressional authority granted in 50
U.S.C.A. § 453. This policy was continued after passage of the Universal Mili-
tary Training and Service Act by Proclamation No. 2942, August 30, 1951, 65
Stat. 35.
The applicable Selective Service Regulation is 32 C.F.R. § 1611.7(c) which
provides: "The duty of every person subject to registration to present himself for
and submit to registration shall continue at all times, and if for any reason such
person is not registered on the day or one of the days fixed for his registration he
shall immediately present himself for and submit to registration before the local
board in the area where he happens to be." (Emphasis added).
2. United States v. Toussie, 280 F. Supp. 473 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
3. 50 U.S.C. § 462(a) (1964), Offenses and penalties. This section makes it a
crime to evade registration or to "neglect or refuse to perform any duty" required
by Selective Service laws.
4. 410 F.2d 1156 (1969).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1964), Offenses not capital. This section provides that,
"Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, no person shall be prosecuted,
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he was indicted in 1967-nearly eight years after the offense was com-
pleted. The government argued that the petitioner was under a continuing
duty to register until age 26 (the last date on which he was obligated to
register), and that the five-year statute of limitations would begin to run
from that time.6
The United States Supreme Court held (in a five-to-three decision)7 that
the government's prosecution of Toussie was barred by the statute of limita-
tions, and reversed his conviction. The gist of the Court's decision was
that failure to register for the draft was not a continuing offense because
it was not explicitly made so by the Selective Service statutes.8 Toussie v.
United States, 397 U.S. 112 (1970).
The significance of the Toussie decision lies in the fact that the United
States Supreme Court overruled three cases which had all held that failure
to register for the draft was a continuing offense. The purpose of this
note is to examine the basis for enactment of statutes of limitations in
criminal law, the relation of that basis to the continuing offense doctrine,
and, finally, the relationship of the two concepts to the decision rendered
in Toussie v. United States.
HISTORY OF, AND BASIS FOR, STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
Quod nullum tempus occurit regi-no lapse of time bars [a prosecution
by] the king. This rule existed as an element of the English common law
from a very early period.9 The common law fixed no time limit within
tried, or punished for any offense, not capital, unless the indictment is found
within five years next after such offense shall have been committed." This provision
for a period of limitation for non-capital offenses embodies a long standing con-
gressional policy and is comprehensive in its language and purpose. See United
States v. Zisblatt Furniture Co., 78 F. Supp. 9 (D.N.Y. 1948); United States v.
Laut, 17 F.R.D. 31 (1955); United States v. McElvain, 272 U.S. 633 (1926).
6. The government asserted that 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 454 and 453 were in-
tended to be read in pari materia by Congress. For section 453 see supra note 1.
Section 454 provides in part "[that, notwithstanding any other provision of law,
any registrant who has failed or refused to report for induction shall continue to re-
main liable for induction and when avalable shall be immediately inducted . . ."
(Emphasis added). However, the government's contention was without merit as
section 454 was enacted (in 1967) after section 453 (1951) and in order for the
two sections to be read in pari materia they would have had to have been enacted at
the same time. (Petitioner's Reply brief at 4).
7. Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court in which Justices Doug-
las, Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall concurred. Mr. Justice White delivered the dis-
senting opinion in which Chief Justice Berger and Mr. Justice Harlan joined.
8. 50 U.S.C. §§ 453 and 454, quoted above in notes 1 and 6.
9. BRACTON, PEROGATIVES, E.5, at 561 and Britton, "De Droit Le Roy," c.18,
at 29, as quoted in United States v. Hoar, 26 Fed. Cases 329, Fed. Case No. 15373,
2 Mason 311 (1821). In United States v. Thompson, 98 U.S. 486, at 489 (1878),
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which a criminal prosecution had to be commenced. 10 Furthermore, it
was held that even where parliament did create a statute of limitations, such
a statute did not apply to the king, unless the statute expressly limited
the king's right to prosecute.11 The exemption of the crown from the opera-
tion of the statute of limitations was said to be based upon public policy.
"It was deemed important that, while the sovereign was engrossed by the
cares and duties of his office, the public should not suffer by the negligence
of his servants."' 2
Contrary to England, European civil law jurisdictions readily adopted
criminal statutes of limitations, based upon Roman law principles. Solici-
tor Murray has written:
[Bly the Roman law criminal liability was extinguished after the expiration of
twenty years from the date of the crime. And this principle of equity, laid down by
the Romans, has been followed in nearly all modem codes, with the important excep-
tion of the law of England.' 3
It should be noted that modem English law now provides for statutes of
limitations for most crimes, bringing England in accord with most Western
countries.
Before the creation of our federal government, colonial legislatures had
Justice Swayne noted that "The rule of nullum tempus occurit regi has existed as
an element of the English law from a very early period. It is discussed in Bracton,
and has come down to the present time." A more recent case, United States v.
Fraidin, 63 F. Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1945) these principles were summarized as
follows: "[Alt common law there was no limitation upon prosecution in criminal
cases and therefore, prosecutions might be instituted at any time after the alleged
commission of a criminal act, unless the time for doing so was limited by statute."
See also, Bush v. International Alliance, 55 C.A.2d 357 (1942).
10. United States v. Thompson, supra note 9, at 489, "The common law fixed no
time as to the bringing of actions. Limitations derive their authority from statutes."
See also, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 630 (1954) citing 2 Stephen, History of The Criminal
Law of England (1883) for examples of old English cases in which prosecution
was begun many years after the commission of the crime.
11. In United States v. Hoar, supra note 9, at 329 it was said: "... no statute of
limitations has been held to apply to actions brought by the crown, unless there
has been an express provision including it." It was said in United States v. Thomp-
son, supra note 9, at 489 that "The King was held never to be included, unless
expressly named."
12. United States v. Thompson, supra note 9, at 489.
13. Murray, The Prescription of Crime, 50 SCOT. L. REV. 259 (1934). Among
the European Civil law jurisdictions that adopted statutes of limitations are France,
Germany, Italy, Austria, and Switzerland. The early French statutes appeared in the
CODE D'INETRUCTION CRIMINELLE which was promulgated in 1808. The French
Code was widely imitated in other European nations. Generally, these codes provide
for different time periods based on the seriousness and nature of the offense. For a
more detailed account see Murray. Numerous examples of English statutes of limi-
tations can be found in HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND, vol. ix, 2d ed. (1933), at
82-83.
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enacted statutes of limitations as early as 1652.14 In the federal system,
periods of limitations for most crimes had been adopted by 1790,15 and
such statutes have persisted to the present day.16 It has been suggested by
some authorities that the far more extensive use of statutory limitations here
rather than in England may have resulted from the fact that early in the
development of American law there was a contest between the civil and
common law for aceptance in the colonies, which resulted in the adoption
of civil law concepts. 17
This historical framework is broadened by an examination of the under-
lying basis for such statutes. What purpose do they serve society by pro-
tecting the offender, who may some day utilize the defense that the statute
of limitations has run? First, statutes of limitations eliminate the evil of
having to defend oneself against stale charges:
Statutes of limitations are founded upon the liberal theory that prosecutions should
not be allowed to ferment endlessly in the files of the government to explode only
after witnesses and proofs necessary to the protection of the accused have by sheer
lapse of time passed beyond availability. 18
Within this expression of policy can be seen an admonition to prosecutors
that they should be diligent in preparing and bringing cases to trial.
Statutes of limitations also help insure that prosecutions will be based
upon evidence that is reasonably fresh. Such statutes are legislative rec-
14. See U. PA. L. REV., supra note 10, at 631, citing WHITMORE, COLONIAL LAWS
OF MASSACHUSETTS 163 (1889); CHARTER AND LAWS OF THE PROVINCE OF PENN-
SYLVANIA 1682-1700, 173-74 (Nead and McComant ed. 1879).
15. 1 United States Statutes at Large, Ch. 9, § 32 (1790). This section pro-
vided that there could be no prosecution or punishment for treason or other capital
offenses unless the indictment be found within three years, nor in other cases un-
less within two years.
16. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3281-91 (1964). These sections prescribe the periods of limi-
tations for various crimes. For example, section 3281 provides that "An indictment
for any offense punishable by death may be found at any time without limita-
tion .... ." Section 3282 is quoted in footnote 5. Section 3290 provides that no
statute of limitation shall extend to any person fleeing from justice. See United
States v. Parrino, 180 F.2d 613 (2nd Cir. 1950).
The proposition that there should be prescribed periods of time within which
prosecution for offenses must be commenced is widely accepted in the United
States. Only South Carolina and Wyoming impose no limitations.
In determining the proper length for periods of limitation legislatures consider
the seriousness of the offense and generally, the more serious crimes have the
longest periods of limitation-or none at all. This is based on the rationale that
the more serious the offense the greater the likelihood that the offender is a con-
tinuing danger to society.
17. See U. PA. L. REV., supra note 10, at 631, citing HOWE, READINGS IN
AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 19 et seq. (1949); RADIN, ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL
HISTORY § 79 (1936).
18. United States v. Eliopoulos, 45 F. Supp. 777, at 781 (D.N.J. 1942).
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ognition'9 of the fact that with the passage of time memories become less
reliable, witnesses may die, and physical evidence becomes more difficult
to obtain and identify. In short, there is less possibility of an erroneous
conviction if prosecution is not unreasonably delayed. 20
Third, if the offender refrains from further criminal activity, the likeli-
hood increases, with the passage of time, that he has reformed, thereby
diminishing the necessity for imposing criminal sanctions. In United States
v. Bonanno,2 ' the court said statutes of limitations serve "to
cut off prosecution for crimes a reasonable time after completion, when no
further danger to society is contemplated from the criminal activity."'22
Finally, an argument closely allied to the third argument is that, as
time goes by, the retributive impulse which may have existed within the
community is likely to yield to a sense of compassion for the person pro-
secuted for an offense long forgotten. An interesting example of this in-
volves the story of Cornelius Pytsch, alias Frank Raboski, who escaped
from a California prison to reside in Northlake, Illinois, where he became
a respected citizen. Raboski got married and made a good living as a
mechanic. In addition, he was the first president of a local homeowners'
association, served on a local government committee, and helped establish
a local crime commission. Eventually, California authorities found Ra-
boski and demanded his return, but Raboski's neighbors rallied behind
him, raising money for his bail and drafting a clemency appeal to Califor-
nia Governor Earl Warren. A Northlake minister was quoted as saying:
"This community cannot afford to lose him."'28
The outcome of Raboski's fate is unknown, but nevertheless his story
19. "[T]he very existence of the statute is a recognition . . . by the legislature
of the fact that time, while it gradually wears out proofs of innocence, has assigned
to it fixed and positive periods in which it destroys proofs of guilt." Quote from
Hogoboom v. State, 120 Neb. 525, at 527-28, 234 N.W. 422, 423 (1931). See also,
People v. Ross, 325 Ill. 417, 421, 156 N.E. 303, 304 (1927); People ex rel. Reibman
v. Warden of the County Jail at Salem, N.Y., 242 App. Div. 282, 284, 275 N.Y.
Supp. 59, 62 (1934).
20. MODEL PENAL CODE, § 1.07, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956). See also,
People v. Ross, supra note 19. In United States v. McWilliams, 69 F. Supp. 812,
815, (D.D.C. 1946) it was stated "As in all long delayed cases, the witnesses now
are scattered; some are not accessible, more particularly to the defendants . . . the
memories of witnesses as to events occurring many years ago are not clear. It is for
those reasons among others that the Constitution of the United States . . . has
imposed a statute of limitations to prevent long delayed prosecutions." Affirmed
and quoted in United States v. McWilliams, 163 F.2d 695, 696; See also,
United States v. Cadaw, 197 U.S. 475 (1905); Ex parte Altman, 34 F. Supp. 106
(S.D. Cal. 1940).
21. United States v. Bonanno, 177 F. Supp. 106 (D.N.Y. 1959).
22. Id. at 112.
23. Time, May 11, 1953, at 24, col. 3.
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raises the question whether society is in fact benefited by prosecuting or re-
turning an escapee to prison where it can be shown that he has rehabili-
tated himself. After all, one of the stated objectives of criminal punish-
ment is to rehabilitate the criminal to the point that he can return to society
as a useful and productive citizen. Where this objective has been attained
through the offender's own efforts, society has little to fear from his future
conduct-and little to gain from his re-incarceration. 24
THE CONTINUING OFFENSE DOCTRINE AND THE OPERATION
OF STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
Crimes can be classified as either instantaneous or continuing, and the
distinction becomes important in determining when the statute of limita-
tions begins to run. Most crimes are considered to be instantaneous: that
is, a crime in which all of the elements occur within a relatively short span
of time and "the criminal objective is speedily attained. ' 25  For
example, rape, robbery, or murder would be properly classified as instan-
taneous crimes, for all their elements are completed at the consum-
mation of the single act.
In contrast to an instantaneous offense is a continuing offense. This
is an offense that involves "a continuous course of conduct, impelled
by a single impulse, to achieve an ultimate unlawful objective."' 26  The
distinguishing feature of the continuing offense is that one illegal act can-
not accomplish the ultimate objective: it is attained only by a pattern of
illegal conduct. 21
24. For a more detailed discussion of this point, see U. PA. L. REV., supra
note 10, at 633. As noted by the author, [t]he criminal who has not been prose-
cuted for a number of years and has chosen to rehabilitate himself would be en-
couraged by knowing that whatever success he achieves will not be destroyed by
the prosecution of a crime that is in his distant past. After a period of time a
person ought to be able to live without fear of prosecution."
25. Government brief, in Toussie v. United States, at 16. See also, United States
v. Midstate Co., 306 U.S. 161, 166 (1939); United States v. Universal Corp., 344
U.S. 218, 224 (1952).
26. Government brief, at 6.
27. Id. at 16. See also Bramblett v. United States, 231 F.2d 489, cert. denied,
350 U.S. 1015 (1956), in which the defendant was charged with falsification of
payroll authorization in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001. The Supreme Court held that
this was a continuing crime since the scheme involved a pattern of conduct,
rather than individual acts which merely exemplified that pattern. But cf. United
States v. Irvine, 98 U.S. 450 (1878); here an attorney was convicted of wrongfully
withholding pension money from a pensioner. The duty to pay it over was cer-
tainly a continuing one, but the Court held that the statute of limitations applied,
and it began to run as soon as the demand for the money was made and the de-
fendant refused to pay. This case illustrated that a court is not always going to
find a continuing offense where there was a continuing duty. A distinction must be
1971] 289
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In the dissenting opinion of Toussie, Mr. Justice White noted that "the
continuing offense is hardly a stranger to American jurisprudence. '28 The
concept encompasses such crimes as embezzlement, 29 conspiracy,3 0 big-
amy 3 failure to provide support,3 2 failure to notify a draft board of a
change of address,3 3 failure of an alien to register in compliance with the
Alien Registration Act,3 4 and, until the Toussie decision, failure to register
for the draft.
3 5
The continuing offense doctrine can be rationalized as follows: in most
cases where it applies, either the nature of the crime itself prevented its
discovery, or else the offender's conduct was such that each day it was in
violation of the law. An example of the former is embezzlement, and an
example of the latter is bigamy. In each case, the state's attorney's ability
to prosecute would be hampered if the offender was given the benefit of
the statute of limtations, for either the crime would not be discovered until
after the statute had run, or the same law would be repeatedly violated, but
the statute would have run as to the initial violations. Even here there
remains a danger in allowing evidence of events long past as proof of the
offense, a danger best typified by continuing conspiracy cases.3 6  Thus,
made between the situation where there is a true continuing offense and where an
offense is instantaneous but the harm caused by it continues over a long period.
This is the distinction that was made in Irvine and implicitly in Toussie.
28. Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 134 (1970).
29. State v. Thang, 188 Minn. 224, 246 N.W. 891 (1933); But cf. State v. Marple,
13 N.J. Misc. 793, 181 A. 278 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
30. Gruenwald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957); United States v. Socony
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601 (1910).
See also, Bramblett and Irvine, supra note 27.
31. Cox v. State, 117 Ala. 103, 23 So. 806 (1898); compare People v. Brady,
257 App. Div. 1000, 13 N.Y.S.2d 789 (2d Dept. 1939), with Commonwealth v.
Ross, 248 Mass. 15, 142 N.E. 791 (1924).
32. Richardson v. State, 30 Del. (7 Boyce) 534, 109 A. 124 (Ct. Gen. Sess.
1920); Towns v. State, 24 Ga. App. 265, 100 S.E. 575 (1919).
33. United States v. Guertler, 147 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1945).
34. United States v. Franklin, 188 F.2d 182 (7th Cir. 1951).
35. Fogel v. United States, 162 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1947); Gara v. United States,
178 F.2d 38, 40 (6th Cir. 1949), af 'd. by an equally divided Court, 340 U.S. 857
(1950); McGregor v. United States, 206 F.2d 583 (4th Cir. 1953). But cf. United
States v. Salberg, 287 F. 208 (N.D. Ohio 1923) holding the duty under the 1917
Act not to be continuing.
36. For example in United States v. Kissel, supra note 30, the defendants were
indicted for conspiracy to restrain trade in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1-7 (1946). The Court, per Holmes, held the conspiracy could be continuing up
to the period of abandonment or success concluded (at 607) that, . . . [w]hen the
plot contemplates bringing to pass a continuous result that will not continue without
the continuous cooperation of the conspirators . . . and there is such continuous
cooperation, it is a perversion of natural thought and of natural language to call
such continuous cooperation a cinematographic series of distinct conspiracies, rather
than to call it a single one.
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while the continuing offense doctrine serves a useful purpose by delaying
the time from which the statute of limitations will begin to run, its applica-
tion should be limited, for too loose an interpretation would allow courts
drastically to debilitate the protection afforded by statutes of limitations.3 7
For example, in State v. Ireland,38 an architect was convicted of negli-
gent manslaughter and of creating a public nuisance. The case arose
when a structure designed in violation of the building code collapsed
thirteen years after it was built. The defendant tried to have the indict-
ment quashed by arguing that the two-year statute of limitations had run.
The court held that the initial violation of the building code constituted a
continuing public nuisance which lasted until abated. Hence, the convic-
tion was affirmed. The A.L.I. Model Penal Code has cited this case as
illustrative of the danger of applying the continuing offense doctrine too
freely. 39 Rather than using the doctrine to undermine the statute of limita-
tions, perhaps it would be better to have the legislature provide for a longer
period of limitation in certain cases.
WHEN DOES THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BEGIN TO RUN?
In deciding when the statute of limitations begins to run in a particular
case, all but two jurisdictions40 hold that the period commences at the time
the offense is committed. 41 In the instantaneous crime, the offense is com-
mitted when every element occurs, 42 for it is at that time the offense is
complete. 43 However, where the crime involved is "continuing," the of-
fense is not complete, for purposes of the statutue of limitations, as long
as the proscribed course of conduct continues. 44 In effect, the continuing
offense doctrine extends the statute of limitation beyond its stated term.
As stated by one commentator, where a continuing offense is involved,
the statute of limitations will run "not from the initial act, which may
in itself embody all of the elements of the crime, but from the occurrence
37. Supra note 10, U. PA. L. REV., at 645.
38. State v. Ireland, 126 N.J.L. 444, 20 A.2d 69 (1941).
39. MODEL PENAL CODE, at 23.
40. ART. 8 LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. (1928); Note, 6 LA. L. REV. 274 (1945); GA.
CODE ANN. § 27-601(4). Louisiana and Georgia held that the period starts to run
from the time the offense is discovered.
41. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956); see also
Pendergast v. United States, 317 U.S. 412, 418 (1943).
42. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956).
43. See Pendergast v. United States, supra note 41 at 418; see also United States
v. Irvine, supra note 27.
44. Supra note 28, see also United States v. Cores, 356 U.S. 405, 409 (1958),
United States v. Kissel, supra note 30, and MODEL PENAL CODE, § 1.07, Comment
(Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956).
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of the most recent act."' 45 For example, in Toussie's case, the government
argued that his failure to register for the draft was a continuing offense.
The five-year statute of limitations, therefore, would not begin to run until
Toussie was 26, when he would no longer be obligated to register for the
draft. On the other hand, it was argued for Toussie that the offense was
completed five days after his 18th birthday, and that the five-year
statute of limitations began to run from the end of that day: five days after
his 23d birthday it would have run its course.
The Toussie case shows the importance of the initial determination, i.e.,
that of classifying a given offense as instantaneous or continuing. Viewed
as an instantaneous crime, no prosecution could have been commenced
after Toussie's 23d birthday; but viewed as a continuing offense,
prosecution could have been commenced as late as thirteen years after the
initial violation of the law. Consideration must now be given to the
guidelines used in determining when an offense is a continuing one for
purposes of statutes of limitations.
In the Toussie decision, the Court discussed the factors which are us-
ually considered in determining when an offense will be deemed to be
"continuing." Because of the conflict between the purposes of statutes of
limitations and the continuing offense doctrine, courts are hesitant to ap-
ply the concept too freely. 46 Further, Congress had declared a policy that
the statute of limitations, embodied in 18 U.S.C. §3282 should not be ex-
tended "[e]xcept as otherwise expressly provided by law."' 47 Finally, Su-
preme Court decisions emphasize that any exception to a general statute of
limitations "is to be construed strictly, and held to apply only to cases shown
to be clearly within its purpose ... ,",48 and that criminal limitation stat-
utes are "to be liberally interpreted in favor of repose."'49 These factors
lead courts to apply the continuing offense doctrine only in limited situa-
tions.50 Therefore, it is the declared policy of the Supreme Court that an
offense will not be regarded as a continuing one "unless the explicit
language of the substantive criminal statute compels such a conclusion, or
45. Supra note 10, U. PA. L. REV., at 642.
46. Supra note 28, at 115.
47. Supra note 28, at 115. Historically, an extension of a statute of limitations
is a legislative not an executive function. The very phrase "statute of limitations"
connotes legislative action. Consequently, an attempt by the executive to extend a
statute of limitation by proclamation would be a usurpation of legislative authority.
(Petitioner's Brief at 20-23).
48. United States v. Dickson, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 141 (1841); Ryan v. Carter,
93 U.S. 78, 83 (1876); see also, United States v. McElvain, supra note 5, at 639.
49. United States v. Scharton, 285 U.S. 518, 522 (1932); United States v. Habig,
390 U.S. 222, 227 (1968).
50. Supra note 28, at 115.
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the nature of the crime involved is such that Congress must assuredly have
intended that it be treated as a continuing one."'51 It is clear from the
Court's position that anyone seeking to establish that a given offense is a
continuing one will have a heavy burden of proof, as such offenses are not
to be readily implied.
FAILURE TO REGISTER BEFORE Toussie
If prior cases were to be prophecy, Toussie's conviction should have been
affirmed by the Supreme Court. However, in Toussie's case, the court
held that failing to register for the draft was not a continuing offense. This
result was reached because the Court thought the explicit language of the
substantive criminal statute did not compel such a conclusion, and coupled
that with the fact that there was no indication that Congress intended that
the crime be deemed a continuing one. But three prior cases had con-
victed defendants on facts similar to Toussie. The Supreme Court
would have to find at least equally convincing reasoning for reversal,
even though these cases were not precedent.
The first case to hold that the failure to register for the draft was a con-
tinuing offense was Fogel v. United States.52 Fogel was prosecuted for
violating the 1940 Selective Training and Service Act;53 he was indicted
in 1947 for failing to register in 1942. At that time, the applicable stat-
ute of limitations was three years,54 and Fogel argued on appeal that his
prosecution was barred by the statute. The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the 5th Circuit said:
Fogel's duty and obligation to register did not end on registration day. . . . The
regulations promulgated under the Act make this exceedingly clear. Section 611.5
(d), Selective Service Regulations, 2d Ed., provides: The duty of every man subject
to registration to present himself for and submit to registration shall continue at all
times, and if for any reason any such man is not registered on the day fixed for his
51. Supra note 28, at 115. It is interesting to note that the MODEL PENAL
CODE, § 1.07, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956) ". . . in effect provides a pre-
sumption against a finding that an offense is a continuing one for purposes of time
limitation. The assumption is that the continuing offense exception too freely ap-
plied is inconsistent with the purpose of time limitations."
52. Fogel v. United States, 162 F.2d 54 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 791
(1947).
53. 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 302 et. seq. The relevant portion of the act provided:
"Except as otherwise provided in this Act, every male citizen of the United States,
and every other male person residing in the United States, who is between the ages
of nineteen and forty-five at the time fixed for his registration shall be liable for
training and service in the land or naval forces of the United States.
54. 18 U.S.C.A. § 582.
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registration, he shall immediately present himself for and submit to registration be-
fore the local board in the area where he happens to be. 55
The court concluded by observing that since Fogel had a continuing duty
to register, his failure to register was a continuing offense. By stating that
Fogel committed an offense that continued right up to the date of finding
the indictment,56 the court in effect said that there was no statute of limi-
tations to Fogel's offense. Presumably, if he was indicted when he was
85 years old the indictment would not be barred. Judge Sibley's dissent in
Fogel took note of the harshness of the court's decision. He said: "The
theory of his conviction is that by doing nothing [failing to register] he re-
newed his crime every day to the date of the trial; which amounts to saying
there is no statute of limitations for this offense."' 57 The fact that Judge
Sibley dissented was probably of no consequence to Fogel, who had to
spend eighteen months in the penitentiary, but at least it represented one
view that was skeptical about applying the continuing offense doctrine to
this type of offense, in the absence of congressional intent that it be
treated as such.
A second case in which the failure to register for the draft was said to
be a continuing offense was McGregor v. United States.58 Here, the court
relied explicitly on Fogel and affirmed McGregor's conviction
of failing to register under the 1948 Selective Service Act.59 The court
rejected McGregor's argument that registration was confined to a single date
and pointed to the "continuing duty regulation" that was the basis of Fo-
gel's conviction. This regulation was issued by President Truman under
authority of the 1948 Act and it was identical6° to the one issued under
the 1940 Act. The McGregor court concluded its opinion by saying:
A similar regulation promulgated by the President under the Selective Service and
Training Act of 1940 was construed by the court in Fogel ... to create a continuing
.obligation, so that every day was a day of registry. We are in accord with this deci-
55. Supra note 52, at 55 (court's emphasis); 162 F.2d 54.
56. Supra note 52, at 55.
57. Supra note 52, at 56.
58. McGregor v. United States, 206 F.2d 583 (4th Cir. 1953).
59. The conscription act in effect during World War II was expressly reenacted
in 1946, except as to specified provisions (Act of June 29, 1946, § 1, 60 STAT.
341). The 1946 Act expired by operation of law on March 31, 1947 (§ 7, 60 STAT.
342), but 15 months later Congress reactivated the draft with the enactment of the
Selective Service Act of 1948 on June 24, 1948 (62 STAT. 604). In 1951, the
1948 Act was broadly amended and redesignated the Universal Military Training and
Service Act (65 STAT. 75). In 1967, the Act was again substantially revised and
renamed the Military Selective Service Act of 1967 (81 STAT. 100). (Government
Brief pp. 15-16).
60. The 1942 regulation was renumbered 32 C.F.R. § 1611.7 in 1948 and it is
presently so designated. See text of note 1 supra.
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sion and the same reasoning requires the conclusion that the present prosecution was
not barred by limitations. 61
Thus, two lower courts reached the same conclusion by relying explicitly
on the "continuing duty" regulation, rather than the Selective Service
Statute itself. This point was not missed by the Toussie Court.
It was successfully argued by the government in Fogel and McGregor
that, since the regulation imposed a continuing duty to register, by analogy
the failure to register was a continuing offense. The argument was also
successful in Gara v. United States.12  In Gara, the defendant was con-
victed of counseling Charles Rickert to refuse to register as required by
the 1948 Selective Service Act. Gara argued that since Rickert refused
to register on September 10, 1948, his offense was complete as of that date,
hence Gara's advice on November 8, 1948, that Rickert should not change
his mind could not affect Rickert's action nor constitute a violation of the
statute. The court said that:
Rickert's failure to perform his obligation to register constituted a completed offense
on September 10, but it was repeated on every day thereafter during the period in-
volved herein, for he was under a continuing duty to register.
63
The Gara court made no mention of when the statute of limitations would
begin to run for Rickert, and so it can be presumed that it would never
begin to run on the offense-just as in Fogel. As noted in the petitioner's
brief, in these three decisions "[t]he continuing duty imposed was
deemed to be open ended with no time limitation whatever.6 4 Judge Dool-
ing of the district court in which Toussie was convicted recognized
this problem and held that a man continues under a duty to present him-
self for registration as long as he is liable for service in the armed forces:
that is, from eighteen years and six months until the twenty-sixth anni-
versary of his birth. 65 Thus, under Judge Dooling's interpretation, the
continuing duty ended at age twenty-six, and it is from that time that the
general statute of limitations would begin to run. Judge Feinberg of the
court of appeals agreed with Judge Dooling's interpretation of the regula-
tion. 66
There was one district court decision, United States v. Salberg,67 which
held that the 1917 Selective Service Act6s did not. impose a continuing
61. Supra note 58, at 584.
62. Gara v. United States, 178 F.2d 38 (6th Cir. 1949), aff'd. by an equally
divided Court, 340 U.S. 857 (1950).
63. Gara v. U.S., 178 F.2d 38 at 40 (6th Cir. 1949).
64. Petitioner's Brief, at 19.
65. Supra note 3, at 474.
66. Supra note 4, at 1157.
67. United States v. Salberg, 287 Fed. 208 (N.D. Ohio 1923).
68. 40 STAT. 76 (1917 Draft Law).
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duty to register.69 Since the 1917 Act provided no limitation on a prose-
cution, it was governed by the general three-year statute of limitations. 70
The 1917 Act, also, was not accompanied by any Presidential Proclama-
tions (regulations) which spelled out a continuing duty to register, as did
the 1940 and 1948 Selective Service Acts under which Fogel, McGregor,
and Gara were convicted. 71 As Mr. Justice Black noted in Toussie:
It is significant that the courts that have concluded that failure to register is a continu-
ing offense have done so by relying explicitly on the regulation [32 C.F.R. §
1611.7(c)] . . . [and] the only court that concluded that the offense was not a con-
tinuing one [Salberg] did so at a time when there was no "continuing duty" regula-
tion issued to implement the registration provisions. 7 2
When the Court decided Toussie, the continuing duty regulation was still
in existence and the government reasserted their argument that where there
is such a continuing duty, failure to perform that duty is a continuing
offense. However, this time the government's attempt to obtain a convic-
tion was thwarted by the Court.
THE Toussie DECISION
Nearly twenty years lapsed between the McGregor and Toussie deci-
sions. Attention will now be centered on the Toussie decision itself, to
determine the "why" of the Court's decision to reverse. In its opinion, the
Supreme Court reviewed the history of the early draft laws to determine
the nature of the present Act, and noted that "throughout the admin-
istration of the first draft law, registration was thought of as a single, instan-
taneous act to be performed at a given time, and failure to register at
that time was a completed criminal offense."73 When the 1940 Selec-
tive Service and Training Act was passed, Congress authorized regis-
tration "at such time or times and place or places" 74 as the President
might designate by proclamation. The first proclamation under the 1940
Act provided a uniform date for the registration of all men. 75 Two years
69. The draft law of 1917 provided that certain persons were subject to registra-
tion and that "upon proclamation by the President . . . stating the time and place of
such registration it shall be the duty of all [such] persons . . . to present themselves
for registration." 40 STAT. 76, 80.
70. 18 U.S.C.A. § 582. This provision is no longer in effect as quoted in
Toussie, supra note 28 at 116, and the general statute of limitations is now five
years. (18 U.S.C. § 3282).
71. The continuing duty regulation was first promulgated under the 1940 Act on
June 5, 1941. Selective System Regulation Vol. 2, § IX, 205(d), 6 Fed. Reg. 2747.
72. Supra note 28, at 121 n.17.
73. Supra note 28, at 117.
74. 50 U.S.C. § 453.
75. Proclamation No. 2425, Sept. 16, 1940 (54 STAT. 2739).
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later, the President issued another proclamation which provided for differ-
ent registration dates for different groups of men. 76 That same proclama-
tion established the basic registration procedure of the present system.
The 1940 Act expired March 31, 1947, but Congress again decided to
register men for the draft and declared that men between the ages of 18
and 26 would be subject to registration. To provide for initial registra-
tion of men between 18 and 26, Congress again authorized the President
to designate the times and places of registration. This was necessary
because at the time there were men of various ages who had to register.
The President required registration of all men between 18 and 26 during
September, 1948, "and all those born after September 19, 1930, were
required to register 'on the day they attain the eighteenth anniversary of
the day of their birth, or within five days thereafter.' ,,77 The registration
provisions of the 1948 Act have remained in force to the present time.
The Court said:
Viewed in the light of history we do not think the Act intended to treat continued
failure to register as a renewal of the original crime or the repeated commission of
Pew offenses, but rather perpetuated the conception of the first registration that a man
must register at a particular time and his failure to do so at that time is a single of-
fense. 78
The Court continued by pointing out that whether or not the process of
registration is continuing depends upon ones vantage point. From
the Selective Service System's viewpoint the process of registration is
a continuing one. But from the registrant's viewpoint the obligation arises
at a specific time. In Toussie's case it arose when he turned 18. He
was allowed a five-day period in which to fulfill the duty, but when he did
not do so, he then and there committed the crime of failing to register. 79
The Government, in arguing that Toussie's offense should be considered
a continuing one, pointed out that the "continuing duty" regulation was
first promulgated under the 1940 Act in June, 1941, and that most lower
federal courts have held that failing to register is a continuing offense for
purposes of the statute of limitations. It was further argued that since
Congress had been silent on the issue, this was an indication Ohat Congress
intended the failure to register to be treated as a continuing offense. The
Court disposed of the government's argument by saying that:
[slince there is no specific evidence that Congress actually was aware of this limita-
tions question when it acted . . . and since we are reluctant to imply a continuing
offense except in limited circumstances, we conclude that any argument based on con-
76. Proclamation No. 2572, Nov. 17, 1942 (56 STAT. 1982).
77. Proclamation No. 2799, July 20, 1948 (62 STAT. 2532).
78. Supra note 28, at 119.
79. Supra note 28, at 119.
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gressional silence is stronger in favor of not construing this Act as incorporating a
continuing offense theory.8 0
Interestingly enough, the Court acknowledged the fact that the regulation
(32 C.F.R. § 1611.7(c)) might be read as making "explicit what Con-
gress implicitly said in the Act itself, that is that registration is a duty that
continues until age 26 and failure to register before then is a criminal of-
fense that can be punished as late as five years after the 26th birthday." 8'
But the Court resisted the attempt by the government to use the regulation
to stretch the five-year statute of limitations into a thirteen-year one. The
Court said:
While it is true that the regulation does in explicit terms refer to registration as a
continuing duty, we cannot give it the effect of making this criminal offense a con-
tinuing one. Since such offenses are not to be implied except in limited circum-
stances, and since questions of limitations are fundamentally matters of legislative
not administrative decision, we think this regulation should not be relied upon effec-
tively to stretch a five-year statute of limitations into a thirteen-year one, unless the
statute itself, apart from the regulation, justifies that conclusion. 8 2
The Court's strong position against the use of the continuing offense doc-
trine in order to avoid the effect of the statute of limitations is designed to
preserve the effectiveness and purposes of such statutes. Implicit in the
opinion is an admonition by the Court to Congress to be explicit when it
wants an offense to be a continuing one for purposes of the statute of limi-
tations and a further warning to the Executive that he does not have the
authority to alter statutes of limitations by proclamation.
In the final analysis, the Toussie Court viewed its task to be that of
interpreting an ambiguous statute. Note that the Supreme Court, in
trying to determine Congressional intent, disregarded the content of the
regulation (issued by the President) and focused solely upon the language
of the statute. This approach was just the opposite of the Fogel and Mc-
Gregor courts which chose the regulation in lieu of the statute. In
United States v. Universal Corporation,83 in the context of considering the
continuous offense doctrine, the Supreme Court said:
[W]hen a choice has to be made between two readings of what conduct Congress
has made a crime, it is appropriate, before we choose the harsher alternative, to re-
quire that Congress should have spoken in language that is clear and definite. We
should not derive criminal outlawry from some ambiguous implication.8 4
This view is consistent with the Constitutional prohibition against the en-
actment of vague and ambiguous laws.
80. Supra note 28, at 120 (Emphasis added).
81. Supra note 28 at 116.
82. Supra note 28, at 121 (Emphasis added).
83. Supra note 25.
84. United States v. Universal Corp., supra note 25, at 221-22.
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The Court concluded that since the Selective Service Statute was am-
biguous in that it did not expressly say that failing to register would be a
continuing offense, any ambiguity in interpreting the statute must be re-
solved in favor of the defendant. The Court was mindful of the fact that
when Congress wanted to make an offense continuing it knew how to use
clear and unambiguous language. For example, Congress has specifi-
cally provided for a continuing liability for induction in 18 U.S.C.A. § 454
(a).85
Thus, in Toussie's case the Court held that the statute of limitations be-
gan to run at the initial failure to register on the last day required by law.
Since Toussie failed to register prior to June 28,1959, the statute began to
run at that time and prosecution based on an indictment returned almost
eight years later was barred. The opinion of Mr. Justice Black was vigor-
ously opposed by a dissenting opinion delivered by Mr. Justice White.
THE DISSENT
Mr. Justice White argued that the question presented in Toussie's case
was simply when the five-year statute of limitations began to run. The
answer to that question depended upon what the offense was for. which the
petitioner was being tried, and when it was that he committed that offense.
The dissent held Toussie's offense was continuing, and agreed with the
district and appeals courts that the statute of limitations would begin to run
from the time Toussie reached his 26th birthday. This conclusion
was reached by reading 50 U.S.C.A. § 453 as creating "the of-
fense of being at one and the same time, unregistered after having been
required to register, and being between the ages of eighteen and twenty-
six."8 6 For the dissent, the only questions to be resolved were "whether,
at any time within five years preceding the indictment, those two charac-
teristics accurately described the accused."'87
In criticizing the majority opinion, the dissent felt that the majority's
85. See text of note 6, supra. See also 18 U.S.C. § 3284 where Congress has
provided that concealment of a bankrupt's assets shall be "[deemed] a continuing
offense . . . and the period of limitations shall not begin to run until . . . final
discharge or denial of discharge."
But cf. Warren v. United States, 199 F. 753 (5th Cir. 1912, decided before the
enactment of 18 U.S.C. § 3284) in which a bankrupt, charged with concealing
assets from his Trustee, was protected by the statute of limitations. Since the bank-
rupt did no new affirmative acts after his first failure to disclose the crime was then
complete and the period of limitation began to run from that time. This case
illustrates that in the absence of express Congressional intent that a crime be re-
garded as continuing, it will not be so regarded.
86. Supra note 28, at 125.
87. Supra note 28, at 126.
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conclusion was contrary not only to the purposes of the entire Act, but also
to the regulations, administrative interpretations, and even the proclama-
tion of the President.88 The dissenting justices felt that the Selective Serv-
ice regulation issued by the President was clearly within the scope of his
authority. They justified their position by asserting that 50 U.S.C.A.
§ 460(b) granted the President the general authority to promulgate all
regulations necessary to fulfill the Act's purposes,89 and that section 453
itself expressly requires registrations at the times and places and in the
manner prescribed by both Presidential proclamation and promulgated
rules and regulations.90  While what the dissent says is true, its criticism
of the majority opinion failed to recognize that the majority did not deny
the authority granted by sections 453 and 460: it stated merely that the
President exceeded the authority of those sections by making the state-
ment in question.
Furthermore, the majority said:
We do not hold, as the dissent seems to imply. . . that the continuing duty regulation
is unauthorized by the Act. All we hold is that neither the regulation nor the Act
itself requires that failure to register be treated as the type of offense that effectively
extends the statute of limitations. 9 1
The key element in the majority's opinion was their refusal to go outside of
the statute in order to make the offense a continuing one, while the dissent-
ing opinion felt that it was proper for the administrative regulation to be
read in conjunction with the statute, thereby creating a continuing duty
to register and making failure to register a continuing offense. The major-
ity admonished Congress to state explicitly when it wants an offense to be
a continuing one, as Congress had done on other occassions, so that ques-
tions of the type presented in Toussie's case would not arise. But Mr. Jus-
tice White sharply criticized the majority opinion for erecting an insur-
mountable obstacle to the declaration of a continuing offense without ex-
press language to that effect in the applicable statute.9 2 The dissent felt
that to require Congress to use special language would be to abdicate the
judicial function of interpretation. 93
CONCLUSION
Since the Court has decided that failing to register for the draft is not a
continuing offense and that the five-year statute of limitations will begin to
run five days after a young man's 18th birthday, it might appear that
88. Supra note 28, at 126.
89. 50 U.S.C. App. § 460(b).
90. 50 U.S.C. App. § 453.
91. Supra note 28, at 121 n.17.
92. Supra note 28, at 135.
93. Supra note 28, at 135.
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the Toussie decision will offer many young men an incentive for not regis-
tering, thereby causing wholesale draft evasion. However, neither the Court
nor legal experts feel that the decision will have this effect. As Mr. Justice
Black noted, the Toussie decision has not diminished the gravity of the of-
fense and the crime is still subject to heavy criminal penalties. 94
We are not convinced that limiting prosecution to a period of five years following
the initial failure to register will significantly impair either the essential function of
raising an army or the prosecution of those who fail to register. We do feel that the
threat of criminal punishment and the five year statute of limitations is a sufficient in-
centive to encourage compliance with the registration requirements. 95
The Court has thus tried to put the meaning of its decision in perspective.
It should be emphasized that the Toussie decision will not affect the
status of those young men who have fled to Canada either to avoid
registration or induction; they can be prosecuted within five years after
their return. Furthermore, a young man who would contemplate taking
the course that Toussie did must ask himself if the threat of criminal pro-
secution is any less real because it is limited to five instead of thirteen
years. Professor Michael Tigar concludes that "It's simply too great a
risk for a young man not to register." 96
It appears that the cornerstone of the Toussie decision was a desire to
preserve the integrity and purposes of the statute of limitations. Mr.
Justice Black, in anticipating adverse public reaction to the Toussie deci-
sion noted that:
There is some cause to feel that dismissal of the indictment in such a case is an injus-
tice in a society based on full and equal application of the laws. But while Congress
has said that failure to register is a crime, it has also made prosecution subject to the
statute of limitations. "Every statute of limitations, of course, may permit a rogue to
escape . . ." but when a court concludes that the statute does bar a given prosecu-
tion, it must give effect to the clear expression of congressional will that in such a
case "no person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished." 97
Perhaps some will feel that Toussie is one of the rogues who escaped, but
respect must be given to congressional will that no person shall be pro-
secuted, tried, or punished for a non-capital offense unless the indict-
ment is found within five years after the commission of the offense. For if
the courts do not respect the statutes of limitation--or try to avoid their
effect-the statutes would not serve their purpose.
Loren I. Mallon
94. Failure to register for the draft is punishable by fine, imprisonment or both.
50 U.S.C. § 162(a).
95. Supra note 28, at 123.
96. As quoted in Time, March 16, 1970, at 47, col. 2.
97. Supra note 28, at 123-24.
